品牌 危機處理

近日從信報紀曉風及書中看到產品出現問題處理手法的經典例子，值得學習。

Benzene in Perrier (1990)
Early 1990, Environmental Protection Department in Charlotte, North Carolina detected traces of benzene were found in bottles of Perrier water.

The concentrations of benzene found in the Perrier varied between 12.3 and 19.9 parts per billion-well above the limit of five parts per billion specified by America's Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but far below the sort of levels that might endanger health. A cup of nonfreeze-dried decaffeinated coffee contains more benzene.

9 Feb 1990: recalled over 70m bottles from North American shops and restaurants. However, not knowing the source of the benzene contamination, Perrier's American arm was confidently announced that the contamination was limited to North America.

11 Feb 1990, a Source Perrier spokesman announced that the source of the benzene was a cleaning fluid mistakenly used on the bottling line that served the North American market; the machine in question had now been cleaned and repaired. Independent tests, showed that the natural source of Perrier water, at Vergeze in the south of France, was unaffected by any pollutants.

12 Feb 1990, it discovered the real cause. Company employees had failed to replace charcoal filters used to screen out impurities in the natural gas that was present in the Perrier spring.

14 Feb 1990, Perrier declared to expand recall globally. Recalled 160 million bottles of Perrier. Frederik Zimmer, president of Perrier's international division quoted "[the spring] naturally contains several gases, including benzene. Those have to be filtered out.". The revelation to public that benzene was present in the spring was a disaster.

Result: US market share 13% cut to 9%. In Britain Perrier's tumbled from 49% to under 30%. France: at first held on to 38% market share, dipped slightly to 34% in 1991.

The mishandling of the early days of the incident cost Mr Leven, Source Perrier's chairman and founder his job. Perrier was sold to Nestle in April 1992.

http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/07/business/nestle-becomes-perrier-owner.html?pagewanted=1

Side note:
The subsequent contest between Nestle and Fiat's Agnellis Family for Perrier is also an classic case study in corporate takeovers.


Johnson & Johnson Tylenol Incident (1982) (&1986?)
1982 年10月，報載芝加哥有7名市民懷疑吃了「特強泰倫諾」（Extra-Strength Tylenol）之後死亡，原因是這種止痛藥被人注射了山埃（cyanide）劇毒。事發前，泰倫諾是美國銷量冠軍，年收1,200萬美元，高佔37%市 場份額。事發後，市場份額即時急挫，只得7%。

事發當初，聯邦調查局（FBI）和食品藥物檢查局（FDA）都反對藥品回收，認為錯不在廠商，但泰倫諾的母公司強生的總裁卻強調，創立強生的基本使命即在保障市民的健康與安全，雖然責任不在其公司，但不回收就違反了公司成立的宗旨。

結果，強生回收了3,100萬樽泰倫諾，經濟損失超過1億美元。與此同時，則發現有72顆泰倫諾被滲入山埃，等於救了72條人命。強生如此果斷的行動，獲傳 媒廣泛報道及稱道。6個星期後，加了三重防改動包裝的全新泰倫諾上市，市場份額比高峰期多一倍，令不少行銷專家大跌眼鏡，而「泰倫諾落毒事件」更成為危機 處理的經典案例，並列入行銷教科書的必讀範圍。



維他奶變味事件 (1995)
1995年12月至翌年2月期間，3名顧客在飲用麥精維他奶時發現有酸味，事件被廣泛報道後，公司即時採取危機處理，將深圳廠房停產，以及回收市面800萬包紙包豆奶產品。

事件仍未平息，更波及其他飲品。公司忍痛再將屯門廠房全面停產，並回收奶類及其他飲品。事件一共要回收飲品1,300萬包。

衞生署後來抽驗飲品，未有發現問題，但維他奶仍然聘請海外專家調查，發現問題源自包裝機，最後將生產線拆除及重新組合，以確保產品質素，消費者對維他奶產品的信心亦慢慢恢復。

萬裕 - 全球第五大的鋁電解電容器製造商

不說不知，萬裕(894) (一間香港公司)己擠身全球第五大的鋁電解電容器製造商(Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitor)。

有趣的是，頭四大的製造商全部都是日本公司。
Capacitor 原理好簡單 (Form 4 有得讀)，好平，是Lab Tech 隨手棄掉的東西，照常理估計，這個市場應早被台灣或大陸公司佔領，沒想到日本仍穩佔大半江山。

要找出頭四大的鋁電解電容器製造商，就要看萬裕2007 年的年報：
http://www.manyue.com/upload/reports/2007_ir.pdf

1. Nippon Chemi-con
2. Nichi-con
3. Rubycon
4. Panasonic

China's Glass Industry landscape...

之前看過別人的blog, 發現美國對玻璃市場的反傾銷是因個別公司而異的。http://accountboyhk.mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=1079134

近日想拿來做個例子，引發我做點研究：

2001年中國入世，向中國玻璃業徵收反傾銷稅。信義玻璃及福耀玻璃連同其他數間公司提出反對。
連續打了6年官司，到2007才有最後判決，取消對福耀玻璃及信義玻璃徵收反傾銷稅，對耀皮玻璃及Benxun...徵收1.47% 反傾銷稅， 對中國其他公司徵收124.50%反傾銷稅。

這個判決製基本上造了一個Oligopoly....其實，再看這幾年間的暫收反傾銷稅率，competition landscape可能一早己經形成了!!

信義玻璃(868)，如今己成為國內第二大玻璃製造商，僅次於A股上市的福耀玻璃。

http://www.hktdc.com/info/mi/a/baus/en/1X00NZ21/1/Business-Alert-%E2%80%93-US/AD-Notices.htm
Manufacturers/ Exporters Weighted-Average
Dumping Margin
Fuyao Glass Industry Group Co, Ltd 9.79%
Xinyi Automotive Glass (Shenzhen) Co Ltd 0.05%
Shenzhen Benxun Auto-Glass Co, Ltd 9.79%
TCG International Inc 9.79%
Wuhan Yaohua Pilkington Safety Glass 9.79%
Changchun Pilkington Safety Glass Ltd 9.79%
Guilin Pilkington Safety Glass Co Ltd 9.79%
China-wide 124.50%

http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/2002/0204frn/02-8166.txt
Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Producer/Manufacturer/Exporter Weighted-Average Margin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FYG............................................ 11.80%
Xinyi.......................................... 3.71%
Benxun......................................... 9.84%
Changchun...................................... 9.84%
Guilin......................................... 9.84%
Wuhan.......................................... 9.84%
TCGI........................................... 9.84%
China-Wide..................................... 124.50%
------------------------------------------------------------------------


http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/E7-21876.pdf
As the litigation in this case has concluded, the Department is amending the Final Determination to reflect the results of our third remand determination. The revised dumping margin in the amended final determination is as follows:
Exporter Margin (percent)
Xinyi Automotive Glass (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. ............. 0.00

The PRC–wide rate continues to be 124.5 percent as determined in the Department’s Final Determination.

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/E7-23961.pdf

Exporter Margin
Changchun Pilkington Safety Glass, Co.,Ltd,.
Guilin Pilkington Safety Glass Co., Ltd.,.
Wuhan Yaohua Pilkington Safety Glass Co., Ltd. .......... 1.47 percent
Shenzhen Benxun Automotive Glass Co.,Ltd. ............................ 1.47 percent

The PRC–wide rate continues to be 124.5 percent as determined in the Department’s Final Determination.